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11 
TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF HYBRIDITY 
 
Paul Schiff Berman* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Debates about non-state normative communities often devolve into clashes 
between two polarized positions. On the one hand, we see the desire to eradicate 
difference through forced obeisance to a single overarching state norm. On the 
other, we see claims of complete autonomy for non-state lawmaking, as if such 
non-state communities could plausibly exist in isolation from the communities that 
both surround and intersect them. 
Neither of these positions takes seriously the importance of engagement and 
dialogue across difference. Navigating difference doesn’t require either 
assimilation or separation; it requires negotiation. Legal pluralists have long 
charted this process of negotiation,1 noting, for example, that colonial legal 
                                                 
*  © 2010 Paul Schiff Berman, Dean and Foundation Professor of Law, Sandra Day 
O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University. This Essay is based on a presentation 
delivered at the Non-State Governance Symposium, held at the University of Utah in 
February 2009. I am grateful to participants in that symposium for useful comments and 
suggestions. Portions of this Essay have appeared in Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal 
Pluralism, 5 ANNUAL REV. OF L. & SOC. SCIENCE 225 (2009); Paul Schiff Berman, 
Federalism and International Law Through the Lens of Legal Pluralism, 73 MO. L. REV. 
1151 (2008); Paul S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007); 
and Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 311 
(2002). For a video of the author’s remarks at the Non-State Governance Symposium, visit 
http://www.ulaw.tv/watch/631/non-state-governance-symposium-paul-berman. 
1  See, e.g., Sally Falk Moore, Legal Systems of the World: An Introductory Guide to 
Classifications, Typological Interpretations, and Bibliographical Resources, in LAW AND 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 11, 15 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) (“[N]ot all the 
phenomena related to law and not all that are lawlike have their source in government.”). 
For further discussions of legal pluralism, see generally BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, 
TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 85–
98 (2d ed. 2002); CAROL WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
AND THE STATE (2002); Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 
J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 37 (2002); Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, 
Transnational Dimensions of Legal Pluralism, in BEGEGNUNG UND KONFLIKT EINE 
KULTURANTHROPOLOGISCHE BESTANDSAUFNAHME 33 (2001); David M. Engel, Legal 
Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives on a Civil Trial Court, 1980 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 425; Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and 
Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 27–34 (1981); John Griffiths, What Is Legal 
Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986); LAW AND GLOBALIZATION 
FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & 
César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005); Sally Engle Merry, International Law and 
Sociolegal Scholarship: Toward a Spatial Global Legal Pluralism, 41 STUD. IN L., POL. & 
SOC’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 149 (2008); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711414
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systems did not eradicate indigenous systems (even when they tried to).2 Instead, 
there was a layering and intermingling of systems. And, just as important, actors 
strategically used the variety of fora to gain leverage and make their voices heard. 
But legal pluralists have usually stopped at the descriptive. Thus, while they 
have catalogued the myriad ways in which state and non-state lawmaking interact, 
they have not taken the next step and attempted to articulate the normative 
jurisprudence that might flow from these observations. After all, it is one thing to 
say that as a descriptive matter interactions among legal and quasi-legal systems 
operating in the same social field inevitably occur; it is quite another to argue (as I 
will attempt to do here) that such messy interactivity is actually a potentially 
desirable feature to build into legal and political systems.  
I call this messy interactivity a jurisprudence of hybridity, and I argue that 
such a jurisprudence may actually be preferable to either a hierarchical 
jurisprudence whereby the hegemonic state imposes a universal norm, or a 
separatist jurisprudence whereby non-state communities attempt to maintain 
complete autonomy.3 Why do I prefer a jurisprudence of hybridity? First, such a 
jurisprudence acknowledges the reality that people hold multiple community 
affiliations, rather than dissolving that multiplicity into either universality or 
separatism. Second, developing procedural mechanisms, institutions, or discursive 
practices that acknowledge hybridity helps to ensure that multiple communities are 
at least taken seriously and given a voice. Third, providing space for multiple 
communities may result in better substantive decisions because there is more space 
for variations and experimentation.4  
                                                                                                                            
REV. 869, 870 (1988); Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous 
Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973); 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Role of Law in Counter-hegemonic Globalization and Global 
Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the Narmada Valley Struggle in India, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L. 345 (2005); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 296 (2000); Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World 
Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).  
2  See, e.g., Leopold Pospisil, Modern and Traditional Administration of Justice in 
New Guinea, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 93 (1981) (examining the change from a traditional 
to a modern legal system in New Guinea). 
3  This is a position I advance at greater length in Paul S. Berman, Global Legal 
Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007). 
4  In focusing on the pluralist opportunities inherent in jurisdictional redundancy, I 
echo the insights of Robert Cover. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional 
Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981). 
Although his essay was focused particularly on the variety of official law pronouncers in 
the U.S. federal system, Cover celebrated the benefits that accrue from having multiple 
overlapping jurisdictional assertions. Such benefits included greater possibility for error 
correction, a more robust field for norm articulation, and a larger space for creative 
innovation. And though Cover acknowledged that it might seem perverse “to seek out a 
messy and indeterminate end to conflicts which may be tied neatly together by a single 
authoritative verdict,” he nevertheless argued that we should “embrace” a “system that 
permits tensions and conflicts of the social order” to be played out in the jurisdictional 
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Of course, acknowledging non-state community affiliations does not 
necessarily mean that they are the same as state communities. Most important, 
states usually (though not always) possess greater access to coercive power such as 
armies, police officers, and the like. Thus, it will often be agents of the state who 
determine the parameters of accommodation to non-state norms, so one should not 
naively assume that there is no hierarchy here.  
Moreover, building mechanisms for acknowledging and accommodating 
multiple community affiliations does not mean states should always defer to those 
communities. For example, some community norms are sufficiently repressive, 
violent, and/or profoundly illiberal that they might not be followed. I argue here 
only that such norms should be considered, not that they should always win. But if 
they are considered, then when a decision maker refuses to defer, that decision 
maker will at least be required to justify why deference is impossible. As we will 
see, requiring such justifications acknowledges and respects community norms 
even when they don’t win and forces the decision maker to offer a compelling 
justification on the other side of the ledger to explain why deference is impossible. 
It seems to me that this process of acknowledgment and justification is a good 
thing. 
In this Essay, I start by referencing work of sociologists and political theorists 
analyzing interpersonal and societal communication, and I contrast a vision 
whereby difference is overcome by assuming commonality with one in which 
“otherness” is seen as an inevitable part of human interaction. I argue that it is 
unwise to attempt to “overcome” difference by trying to forge sameness. Yet, it is 
equally unwise, in a globally integrated world, to expect that walls of separation 
(either literal or conceptual) will be effective. Thus, we should aspire to a state of 
unassimilated otherness in an integrated community. In such a state, we seek 
communication across difference rather than annihilation of difference.  
Then, I turn to law and survey three different procedural mechanisms that are 
or could be examples of a jurisprudence of hybridity with regard to non-state 
communities. First, I examine the idea of building margins of appreciation into 
constitutional jurisprudence to allow some scope for local and non-state 
community variation. Second, I explore the possibility that limited autonomy or 
participation regimes can help ensure some scope for non-state norms. And third, I 
suggest that thinking of non-state norms through the prism of conflict of laws 
doctrines—jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of judgments—might be 
preferable to the more mechanistic ways in which clashes between state and non-
state norms are often judged. 
The excruciatingly difficult case-by-case questions concerning how much to 
defer and how much to impose are probably impossible to answer definitively and 
are, at any rate, beyond the scope of this Essay. The crucial antecedent point, 
however, is that although people may never reach agreement on norms, they may 
                                                                                                                            
structure of the system. Id. at 682. Thus, Cover’s pluralism, though here focused on U.S. 
federalism, can be said to include the creative possibilities inherent in multiple overlapping 
jurisdictions asserted by both state and non-state entities in whatever context they arise. 
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at least acquiesce in procedures, institutions, or practices that take hybridity 
seriously, rather than ignoring it through assertions of either universalist state 
imperatives or inflexible conceptions of non-state autonomy. A jurisprudence of 
hybridity, in contrast, seeks to preserve the spaces of opportunity for contestation 
and local variation that legal pluralists have long documented, and therefore a 
focus on hybridity may at times be both normatively preferable and more practical 
precisely because agreement on substantive norms is so difficult. And again, the 
claim is only that the independent values of pluralism should always be factored 
into the analysis, not that they should never be trumped by other considerations.  
Of course, one thing that a jurisprudence of hybridity will not do is provide an 
authoritative metric for determining which norms should prevail in this messy 
hybrid world. Nor does it answer the question of who gets to decide. Indeed, 
pluralism fundamentally challenges both the positivist and natural rights-based 
assumption that there can ever be a single answer to such questions. For example, 
as noted previously, the state’s efforts to squelch a non-state community are likely 
only to be partial, so the state’s assertion of its own trumping authority is not the 
end of the debate, but only one gambit in an ongoing normative discourse that has 
no final resolution.5 Likewise, there is no external position from which one could 
make a definitive statement as to who is authorized to make decisions in any given 
case. Rather, a statement of authority is itself inevitably open to contest. Power 
disparities matter, of course, and those who wield coercive force may be able to 
silence competing voices for a time. But even that sort of temporary silencing is 
rarely the end of the story, either. Thus, instead of the unitary answers assumed by 
universalism and separatism, a jurisprudence of hybridity is a “jurisgenerative” 
model6 focusing on the creative interventions offered by various normative 
communities, drawing on a variety of normative sources in ongoing political, 
rhetorical, and legal iterations.7 
At the same time, mechanisms, institutions, and practices of the sort discussed 
in this Essay require actors to at least be willing to take part in a common set of 
discursive forms. This is not as idealistic as it may at first appear. Indeed, as 
                                                 
5  Lauren Benton, Making Order out of Trouble: Jurisdictional Politics in the Spanish 
Colonial Borderlands, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 373, 375–76 (2001) (describing jurisdictional 
politics in seventeenth-century New Mexico and observing that, while “the crown made 
aggressive claims that royal authority and state law superseded other legal authorities,” in 
reality, “[j]urisdictional disputes became not just commonplace but a defining feature of 
the legal order”). 
6  See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term–Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11–15 (1983). 
7  Cf. SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 49 (2006) (“Whereas natural 
right philosophies assume that the principles that undergird democratic politics are 
impervious to transformative acts of popular collective will, and whereas legal positivism 
identifies democratic legitimacy with the correctly generated legal norms of a sovereign 
legislature, jurisgenerative politics is a model that permits us to think of creative 
interventions that mediate between universal norms and the will of democratic 
majorities.”).  
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Jeremy Waldron has argued, “[t]he difficulties of inter-cultural or religious-secular 
dialogue are often exaggerated when we talk about the incommensurability of 
cultural frameworks and the impossibility of conversation without a common 
conceptual scheme. In fact, conversation between members of different cultural 
and religious communities is seldom a dialogue of the deaf . . . .”8 Nevertheless, it 
is certainly true that some normative systems deny even this limited goal of mutual 
dialogue. Such systems would (correctly) recognize the liberal bias within the 
hybrid vision I explore here, and they may reject the vision on that basis. For 
example, although abortion rights and antiabortion activists could, despite their 
differences, be said to share a willingness to engage in a common practice of 
constitutional adjudication, those bombing abortion clinics are not similarly 
willing; accordingly, there may not be any way to accommodate such actors even 
within a more pluralist, hybrid framework. Likewise, communities that refuse to 
allow even the participation of particular subgroups, such as women or minorities, 
may be difficult to include within the pluralist vision I have in mind. Of course, 
these groups are undeniably important forces to recognize and take account of as a 
descriptive matter. But from a normative perspective, an embrace of a 
jurisprudence of hybridity need not commit one to a worldview free from 
judgment, where all positions are equivalently embraced. Thus, I argue not 
necessarily for undifferentiated inclusion, but for a set of procedural mechanisms, 
institutions, and practices that are more likely to expand the range of voices heard 
or considered, thereby creating more opportunities to forge a common social space 
than either statism or separatism.9 
 
I.  SELF, OTHER, AND THE NEGOTIATION OF DIFFERENCE 
 
Sociological studies of communication often start from the idea that 
interpersonal interaction requires both parties in an encounter to believe (or at least 
assume) that the other is not truly other at all.10 According to this view, most 
associated with Alfred Schutz,11 differences in individual perspectives are 
overcome only if each party tacitly believes that he/she could effectively trade 
places with the other. As Schutz describes it, “I am able to understand other 
                                                 
8  Jeremy Waldron, Public Reason and “Justification” in the Courtroom, 1 J.L., PHIL. 
& CULTURE 107, 112 (2007).  
9  This focus on jurisgenerative structures, rather than on the necessary inclusion of, 
or deference to, all points of view, may differentiate a jurisprudence of hybridity from 
multiculturalism.  
10  My discussion here relies heavily on Z.D. Gurevitch, The Other Side of Dialogue: 
On Making the Other Strange and the Experience of Otherness, 93 AM. J. SOC. 1179 
(1988). 
11  See generally ALFRED SCHUTZ, ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS 
(Helmut R. Wagner ed., 1970) [hereinafter SCHUTZ, ON PHENOMENOLOGY]; ALFRED 
SCHUTZ, COLLECTED PAPERS I: THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL REALITY (Maurice Natanson ed., 
4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter SCHUTZ, PROBLEM]; Alfred Schutz, The Stranger: An Essay in 
Social Psychology, 49 AM. J. SOC. 499 (1944). 
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people’s acts only if I can imagine that I myself would perform analogous acts if I 
were in the same situation . . . .”12 Thus, differences in perspective are reduced to 
differences in situation. Any possibly more fundamental differences are suppressed 
to facilitate dialogue.  
As a result, the deliberate “assuming away” of the unfamiliar is seen as a 
constant part of everyday life. The unfamiliar is relegated to the category of 
“strange,” and “strangeness” necessarily is placed elsewhere, somewhere other 
than the interaction at hand.13 Moreover, Harold Garfinkel and other 
ethnomethodologists have argued that individuals do not simply passively maintain 
these assumptions, but are constantly engaged in a joint enterprise aimed at 
sustaining this familiarity.14 In all of these studies, the emphasis is on “the human 
production of common worlds of meaning as the only axis on which dialogue 
rotates.”15 
But is that all there is to the experience of the other? Is it really imperative 
constantly to assume that our fellow human beings are fundamentally identical to 
us? After all, as Z.D. Gurevitch has argued, “[u]nder this principle, if a dialogue is 
to take place, strangeness as a phenomenon of everyday interaction must be 
considered negatively, namely, as that part of an encounter that must be constantly 
‘assumed away’ by the participants.”16 Thus, we are left with a world in which 
people are classified either as familiar or as strangers. And, even more 
problematic, these studies suggest that it will be simply impossible to bridge the 
communication gap with those deemed strangers. Yet, as Georg Simmel noted 
long ago, the stranger is never truly distant,17 so there will need to be some way of 
bridging gaps short of assuming away strangeness altogether. 
To seek an alternative formulation, we might turn to political philosophy. 
Hannah Arendt, for example, offers a different way of conceptualizing the 
encounter with the stranger. Instead of assuming commonality, she seeks, in 
“Understanding and Politics,” the quality that “makes it bearable to live with other 
people, strangers forever, in the same world, and makes it possible for them to bear 
with us.”18 Note that for Arendt the task is how to “bear with” strangers, even 
                                                 
12  SCHUTZ, ON PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 11, at 181. 
13  See Gurevitch, supra note 10, at 1180 (summarizing arguments in SCHUTZ, 
PROBLEM, supra note 11). 
14  See Harold Garfinkel, Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities, in 
STUDIES IN SOCIAL INTERACTION 1, 3 (David Sudnow ed., 1972). 
15  Gurevitch, supra note 10, at 1180. 
16  Id. at 1181–82. 
17  See GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 402–08 (Kurt H. Wolff 
ed. & trans., 1950) (describing the phenomenon of how a stranger, who appears distant, is 
actually very near). 
18  HANNAH ARENDT, Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding), 
in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING 307, 322 (Jerome Kohn ed., 1994). 
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while recognizing that they will forever be strange.19 Significantly, this task is very 
different from the more intimate communication relationships studied in the 
sociological literature discussed above. After all, if strangers are “forever strange,” 
their strangeness cannot be overcome through psychological assumptions; a 
different strategy is necessary. 
 Arendt’s strategy for bearing with strangers is more than just mutual 
indifference and more than just toleration. It “involves a mental capacity 
appropriate for an active relation to that which is distant,”20 which Arendt locates 
in King Solomon’s gift of the “understanding heart.”21 Understanding, according to 
Arendt, “is the specifically human way of being alive; for every single person 
needs to be reconciled to a world into which he was born a stranger and in which, 
to the extent of his distinct uniqueness, he always remains a stranger.”22 And what 
does “understanding” entail for Arendt? This is a bit difficult to pin down, but she 
makes clear that it is not gained through direct experience of the other, and it is not 
just knowledge of the other.23 Instead, understanding starts from the individual 
situated apart from others. Thus, instead of “feeling your pain,” understanding 
involves determining what aspects of the pain people feel has to do with politics, 
and what politics can do to resolve our common dilemmas. Moreover, 
“[u]nderstanding can be challenged and is compelled to respond to an alternative 
argument or interpretation.”24 In short, understanding in Arendt’s formulation 
looks a lot less like empathy and a lot more like judging.25 
This more distanced conception of the encounter with the stranger appears to 
have something in common with Iris M. Young’s vision of “unassimilated 
otherness,” which she posits as the relation among people in the ideal 
“unoppressive city.”26 Young envisions ideal city life as the “‘being-together’ of 
strangers.”27 These strangers may remain strangers and continue to “experience 
each other as other.”28 Indeed, they do not necessarily seek an overall group 
identification and loyalty. Yet, they are open to “unassimilated otherness.”29 They 
belong to various distinct groups or cultures and are constantly interacting with 
                                                 
19  In focusing on Arendt’s idea of “bearing with strangers,” I draw from the analysis 
in Phillip Hansen, Hannah Arendt and Bearing with Strangers, 3 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 
3 (2004). 
20  Id. at 3. 
21  ARENDT, supra note 18, at 322. 
22  Id. at 308. 
23  See id. at 313. 
24  Jean Bethke Elshtain, Judging Rightly, FIRST THINGS 49, 49 (November 1994) 
(reviewing ARENDT, supra note 18). 
25  See ARENDT, supra note 18, at 313. 
26  See Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, 12 
SOC. THEORY & PRACTICE 1, reprinted in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 300, 317, 319 
(Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990) (“Our political ideal is the unoppressive city.”). 
27  Id. at 318. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. at 319. 
18 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
other groups. But they do so without seeking either to assimilate or to reject those 
others. Such interactions instantiate an alternative kind of community,30 one that is 
never a hegemonic imposition of sameness but that nevertheless prevents different 
groups from ever being completely outside one another.31 In a city’s public spaces, 
Young argues, we see glimpses of this ideal: “The city consists in a great diversity 
of people and groups, with a multitude of subcultures and differentiated activities 
and functions, whose lives and movements mingle and overlap in public spaces.”32 
In this vision, there can be community without sameness, shifting affiliations 
without ostracism. 
This discussion does not, of course, even scratch the surface concerning the 
myriad ideas and writings available about the encounter between Self and Other. 
Yet, for our purposes, we can at least establish one possible dichotomy that might 
be useful. At the most general level, the analyses discussed above suggest that, in 
responding to the other, we can pursue at least two possible strategies, which are 
very different from each other. We can seek commonality and assume away 
perceived difference, or we can acknowledge entrenched difference and attempt to 
bridge gaps. 
Each of these strategies has its analogue in law. We could assume that in the 
encounter with other communities our choices are limited to either full 
commonality or complete separation. If so, then in the consideration of non-state 
community norms we end up with a debate among the statist and separatist 
positions. And we would be forced simply to draw lines between the two. But the 
alternative, represented here by Arendt and Young, posits a hybrid reality. Here, 
the idea is to build legal structures that foster dialogue across difference, 
negotiation without assimilation. Is such a hybrid jurisprudence possible? Let us 
see. 
 
II.  A JURISPRUDENCE OF HYBRIDITY 
 
Now we turn to explore three possible mechanisms that might form 
components of a jurisprudence of hybridity. Each of these mechanisms is premised 
on the idea of multiple community affiliation. Therefore, instead of insisting that 
one affiliation necessarily trumps the others, we seek ways of fostering dialogue 
and mutual accommodation if possible. And if accommodation is not possible, a 
                                                 
30  Young resists using the word “community” because of the “urge to unity” the term 
conveys, but acknowledges that “[i]n the end it may be a matter of stipulation whether one 
chooses to call . . . [her vision] ‘community.’” Id. at 320; see also Jerry Frug, The 
Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1996) (“Unlike Young, I do not 
cede the term community to those who evoke the romance of togetherness.”). 
31  See Young, supra note 26, at 319 (positing that a group of strangers living side by 
side “instantiates social relations as difference in the sense of an understanding of groups 
and cultures that are different, with exchanging and overlapping interactions that do not 
issue in community, yet which prevent them from being outside of one another”). 
32  Id. 
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jurisprudence of hybridity at least requires an explanation of why it is impossible 
to defer. 
 
A.  Margins of Appreciation 
 
One mechanism of accommodation can be drawn from the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR): the oft-discussed “margin of 
appreciation” doctrine.33 The idea here is to strike a balance between deference to 
national courts and legislators on the one hand, and maintaining “European 
supervision” that “empower[s the ECHR] to give the final ruling” on whether a 
challenged practice is compatible with the Convention, on the other.34 Thus, the 
margin of appreciation allows domestic polities some room to maneuver in 
implementing ECHR decisions to accommodate local variation. How big that 
margin is depends on a number of factors including, for example, the degree of 
consensus among the member states. Thus, in a case involving parental rights of 
transsexuals, the ECHR noted that because there was as yet no common European 
standard and “generally speaking, the law appears to be in a transitional stage, the 
respondent State must be afforded a wide margin of appreciation.”35 
Affording this sort of variable margin of appreciation usefully accommodates 
a limited range of pluralism. It does not permit domestic courts to fully ignore the 
supranational pronouncement (though domestic courts have sometimes asserted 
greater independence36). Nevertheless, it does allow space for local variation, 
particularly when the law is in transition or when no consensus exists among 
member states on a given issue. Moreover, by framing the inquiry as one of local 
consensus, the margin of appreciation doctrine disciplines the ECHR and forces it 
to move incrementally, pushing towards consensus without running too far ahead 
of it. Finally, the margin of appreciation functions as a signaling mechanism 
through which “the ECHR is able to identify potentially problematic practices for 
the contracting states before they actually become violations, thereby permitting 
the states to anticipate that their laws may one day be called into question.”37 And, 
                                                 
33  A particular useful, succinct summary can be found in Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 
273, 316–17 (1997). My discussion here largely tracks theirs.  
34  Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 276 (1979). 
35  X v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 143, 169 (1997); see also Otto-Preminger 
Inst. v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34 (ser. A) at 58 (1995) (finding that the lack of a uniform 
European conception of rights to freedom of expression “directed against the religious 
feelings of others” dictates a wider margin of appreciation). 
36  See, e.g., Nico Krisch, The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law, 71 
MOD. L. REV. 183, 196–97 (2008) (discussing the interaction between the ECHR and state 
constitutional courts). 
37  Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 33, at 317 (citing Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, 
Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 133, 
141 (1993)) (noting that the Convention “puts other less progressive states on notice that 
the laws may no longer be compatible with the Convention if their nationals were to 
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of course, there is reverse signaling as well, because domestic states, by their 
societal evolution away from consensus, effectively maintain space for local 
variation. As Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter have observed, “The 
conjunction of the margin of appreciation doctrine and the consensus inquiry thus 
permits the ECHR to link its decisions to the pace of change of domestic law, 
acknowledging the political sovereignty of respondent states while legitimizing its 
own decisions against them.”38 A similar sort of interaction could be established by 
a constitutional court adopting some form of the classic concept/conception 
distinction39 with regard to the adoption of norms by other actors. Thus, an entity 
such as the ECHR could, for example, articulate a particular concept of rights 
while recognizing that the way this right is implemented is subject to various 
alternative conceptions. Thus, legal regimes could usefully adopt margins of 
appreciation with regard to non-state community norms. Such a flexible approach 
might allow communities more leeway in trying to make statements of rights work 
within a particularized community context. 
 
B.  Limited Autonomy Regimes 
 
As noted above, interactions between state and non-state law pose a particular 
kind of margin of appreciation issue. Here, as with the supranational/national 
dialectic, we have two different normative orders that can neither ignore nor 
eliminate the other. Thus, the question becomes what mechanisms of pluralism can 
be created to mediate the conflicts? This problem classically arises in the context 
of religion or ethnicity, though it is in no way limited to such communities. 
Nevertheless, an overview of mechanisms for managing religious and ethnic (or 
linguistic-group) hybridity may shed light on the possibility of building institutions 
to address non-state normative communities in a variety of settings. 
In a useful summary, Henry Steiner has delineated three distinct types of 
autonomy regime.40 The first allows a territorially concentrated ethnic, religious, or 
                                                                                                                            
challenge them.”). For an example of this type of signaling, see J.G. MERRILLS, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 81 
(2d ed. 1993) (1986) (interpreting the ECHR’s statement in Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1986), that “[t]he need for appropriate legal measures [to 
protect transsexuals] should therefore be kept under review having regard particularly to 
scientific and societal developments” as a “strong hint that while British practice currently 
satisfied [the Convention], the Court’s duty to interpret the Convention as a living 
instrument may lead it to a different conclusion in the future.”). 
38  Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 33, at 317. 
39  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 71 (1986) (discussing the difference 
between “concept” and “conception” as “a contrast between levels of abstraction at which 
the interpretation of the practice can be studied”). 
40  Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes 
for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1541–42 (1991) (identifying three different 
types of autonomy regimes for ethnic minorities including a power-sharing regime, a 
territorial regime, and an autonomy regime). 
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linguistic minority group limited autonomy within the nation-state.41 The precise 
contours of this autonomy can vary considerably from situation to situation. 
However, such schemes can include the creation of regional elective governments, 
command of local police, control over natural resources, management of regional 
schools, and so on.42 With regard to language, communities may be empowered to 
create language rights within their regions.43 
Of course, non-state normative communities are often dispersed throughout a 
state, making it difficult to create specific local zones of autonomy.44 In such cases, 
other potential autonomy regimes may be more effective.45 A second possibility, 
therefore, involves direct power-sharing arrangements.46 “Such regimes carve up a 
state’s population in ethnic terms to assure one or several ethnic groups of a 
particular form of participation in governance or economic opportunities.”47 Thus, 
we may see provisions that set aside a fixed number of legislative seats, executive 
branch positions, or judicial appointments to a particular religious or ethnic 
minority group.48 In addition, legislators who are members of a particular minority 
group may be granted the ability to veto proposed measures adversely affecting 
that group.49 Alternatively, states may enact rules requiring formal consultation 
                                                 
41  See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, 
MULTICULTURALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP 156–59 (2001) (arguing that the creation of 
linguistically homogeneous, separate institutions for minority subgroups within a larger 
federal structure will foster the participation of minority groups in democracy by giving 
them the autonomy to control cultural policy). 
42  See Steiner, supra note 40, at 1542 (listing examples). 
43  See, e.g., Wouter Pas, A Dynamic Federalism Built on Static Principles: The Case 
of Belgium, in FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 157, 
158–59 (G. Alan Tarr, Robert F. Williams & Josef Marko eds., 2004) (“[I]n 1970, the 
Belgian State was divided into four territorial linguistic regions: The Dutch-speaking 
region, the French-speaking region, the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital, and the 
German-speaking region. . . . The authorities in each region may, in principle, only use the 
official language of that region in their dealings with citizens. In some municipalities, 
where a significant number of the inhabitants speak another language, special provisions 
were enacted to give individuals the right to continue to use their own language in their 
relations with the local authorities.”) (citation omitted). 
44  See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language and Participation, 94 CAL. L. REV. 
687, 744 (2006) (“Devolution to minority-run institutions will not help secure rights for 
disparate ethnic groups spread out over a nation’s territory . . . .”). 
45  See id.  
46  See, e.g., Ivo D. Duchacek, Federalist Responses to Ethnic Demands: An 
Overview, in FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION 59, 67, 71 (Daniel J . Elazar ed., 
1979) (arguing that fostering democratic pluralism and an open political system is one way 
to meet ethnic demands); Arend Lijphart, The Power-Sharing Approach, in CONFLICT AND 
PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES 491 (J. Montville ed. 1990). 
47  Steiner, supra note 40, at 1541. 
48  Id. at 1541–42. 
49  Id. 
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before decisions are taken on issues that particularly impact minority 
communities.50 
Finally, a third autonomy regime contemplates the reality that members of an 
ethnic community may invoke the idea of a personal law that is carried with the 
individual, regardless of territorial location. This personal law is often religious in 
character, and it reflects a primary identification with one’s religious or ethnic 
group, rather than the territorially delimited community of the nation-state.51 
Accordingly, state law may seek to create what are essentially margins of 
appreciation to recognize forms of autonomy for these identities.52 “Like power 
sharing, a personal law can provide an important degree of autonomy and cohesion 
even for minorities that are territorially dispersed.”53 
The question of accommodation to personal law is not a new one, nor is it 
limited to religious groups. In ancient Egypt, foreign merchants in commercial 
disputes were sometimes permitted to choose judges of their own nationality so 
foreigners could settle their dispute “in accordance with their own foreign laws and 
customs.”54 Greek city-states adopted similar rules.55 Later, legal systems in 
England and continental Europe applied personal law to foreign litigants, judging 
many criminal and civil matters based not on the territorial location of the actors, 
but on their citizenship.56 In the ninth century, for example, King Edgar allowed 
Danes to be judged by the laws of their homeland.57 Likewise, William the 
Conqueror granted eleventh-century French immigrants the right to be judged by 
rules based on their national identity.58 Foreign merchants trading under King 
John, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, were similarly governed by the law of 
their home communities.59 
As noted previously, the relationship between state and personal law 
frequently arose in colonial settings where western legal systems were layered on 
top of the personal laws and customs of indigenous communities. Indeed, in the 
colonial context, margins of appreciation and other forms of accommodation were 
                                                 
50  Id. at 1542. 
51  See, e.g., Chibli Mallat, On the Specificity of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism, 38 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 13, 47 (2006) (contrasting the “personal model” with the 
“territorial model”). 
52  Chibli Mallat calls this scheme “‘communitarian’ (or personal) federalism.” Id. at 
51. 
53  Steiner, supra note 40, at 1542. 
54  COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT 
GREECE AND ROME 193 (1911). 
55  See DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 220, 222–24 (H. 
H. Scullard ed., 1978) (noting that the Athenian legal system provided “xenodikai” or 
“judges of aliens” to handle an influx of cases involving foreign citizens in the first half of 
the fifth century). 
56  See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND 
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE 7 (1994). 
57  Id. at 8. 
58  Id. at 10. 
59  Id. at 12–13. 
2010] JURISPRUDENCE OF HYBRIDITY 23 
often invoked as governing legal principles. For example, English courts were 
empowered to exercise the jurisdiction of the English courts of law and chancery 
only “as far as circumstances [would] admit.”60 Likewise, with respect to personal 
laws, the Straits Settlements Charter of 1855 allowed the courts of judicature to 
exercise jurisdiction as an ecclesiastical court “so far as the religions, manners and 
customs of the inhabitants admit.”61 “By the end of the colonial era, indigenous 
law was recognized as law proper by all the colonial powers.”62 
Today, particularly in countries with a large minority Muslim population, 
many states maintain space for personal law within a nominally Westphalian legal 
structure. These nation-states—ranging from Canada to the United Kingdom to 
Egypt to India to Singapore—recognize parallel civil and religious legal systems, 
often with their own separate courts.63 And civil legal authorities are frequently 
called on to determine the margin of appreciation to be given to such personal law. 
For example, the Indian Supreme Court has famously attempted to bridge secular 
and Islamic law in two decisions involving Muslim women’s right to maintenance 
after divorce.64 At the same time, issues arise concerning the extent to which 
members of a particular religious or ethnic community can opt out of their personal 
law and adopt the law of the nation-state. For example, in 1988 a Sri Lankan court 
decided that a Muslim couple could adopt a child according to state regulation but 
could not confer inheritance rights on their adopted child because Islamic Law did 
                                                 
60  Siak v. Drashid, [1946] 1 MALAYAN L.J. 147, 152 (App. Ct. Sept. 13, 1941). 
61  ROLAND ST. JOHN BRADDELL, THE LAW OF THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS: A 
COMMENTARY 17 (3d ed. 1982). Interestingly, in the era prior to the Age of Empire, 
English courts would only defer to indigenous laws of Christian communities. For 
example, in Calvin’s Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1 a, [18a] (1608), reprinted in 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 
398 (1932), Lord Coke stated that if a King conquers a Christian kingdom, “he may, at his 
pleasure, alter the laws of the kingdom, but until he [does] so the ancient laws . . . remain. 
But if a Christian king should conquer the kingdom of an infidel, and bring them under his 
subjugation, [then] ipso facto, the laws of the infidels are abrogated, for that they are not 
only against Christianity but against the law of God and of nature, contained in the 
decalogue . . . .” However, by at least 1774, that distinction appears to have fallen into 
disrepute. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hall, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 848 (K.B.) at 882 (“Don’t quote 
the distinction [between Christians and non-Christians] for the honour of my Lord Coke.”). 
62  DAVID PEARL, INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND 
BANGLADESH 26 (1981). Pearl excludes Germany and notes that the recognition of 
indigenous law created an internal conflicts of law regime, which seems implicitly to 
recognize some sort of autonomous legitimacy for indigenous practices. 
63  See Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the 
Shari’a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949, 1984 (1995); DeNeen 
L. Brown, Canadians Allow Islamic Courts to Decide Disputes: Sharia Gains Foothold in 
Ontario, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2004, at A14 (discussing an Islamic Court of Civil Justice 
in Ontario, staffed by arbitrators trained in both Sharia and Canadian civil law). 
64  See Latifi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 3958, 3973; Mohammed Ahmed 
Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 844 (India).  
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not recognize adoption.65 Even outside of the context of Islamic law, the United 
States Supreme Court has at times deferred to the independent parallel courts 
maintained by Indian populations located within U.S. territorial borders.66 And 
beyond judicial bodies, we will increasingly see other governmental entities, such 
as banking regulators, forced to oversee forms of financing that conform to 
religious principles.67 These sorts of negotiations, like all the limited autonomy 
regimes surveyed in this section, reflect official recognition of essential hybridity 
that the state cannot wish away. 
 
C.  Conflicts of Laws 
 
Because non-state lawmaking is not usually conceived of as law, we do not 
usually think of clashes between state and non-state law through the prism of 
conflicts of law jurisprudence. But we could. Indeed, the three classic legal 
doctrines often grouped together under the rubric of conflict of laws—jurisdiction, 
choice of law, and judgment recognition—are specifically meant to manage hybrid 
legal spaces. However, although these doctrines are where one would most expect 
to see creative innovations springing forth to address hybridity, they have only 
infrequently been used in this way. Thus, it may be helpful to consider how 
communities could use choice-of-law and judgment recognition doctrines to 
manage the reality of multiple community affiliation. 
To illustrate, I explore two well-known cases in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court was forced to determine how state-based lawmaking would interact with the 
norms of a religious community. First, in Bob Jones University v. United States, 
the Court addressed an IRS decision to deny tax-exempt status to a religious school 
that interpreted Christian scriptures to forbid “interracial dating and marriage.”68 
Second, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith, the question was whether a general state statute forbidding certain narcotics 
should be applied to an Indian tribe’s religious practice that included the use of 
peyote.69 To my mind, viewing these conflicts as choice-of-law questions makes 
the analytical framework more coherent (though, it should be noted, no less 
difficult). 
Turning to Bob Jones, the Internal Revenue Service had interpreted Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which gives tax-exempt status to 
qualifying charitable institutions, to apply to schools only if such schools have a 
“racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students.”70 Accordingly, the Service 
denied tax exemption to Bob Jones University, which had not admitted blacks at 
                                                 
65  See, e.g., Ghouse v. Ghouse, (1988) 1 Sri L.R. 25, 28.  
66  See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71–72 (1978). 
67  See, e.g., Tavia Grant, Sharia-Compliant Finance Is Increasingly Popular, GLOBE 
& MAIL (Toronto), May 7, 2007, https://secure.globeadvisor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/ 
story/RTGAM/20070507/wrislam07. 
68  461 U.S. 574, 580–82 (1983). 
69  494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). 
70  Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 579. 
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all until 1971, and had admitted them thereafter but had forbidden interracial 
dating, interracial marriage, the espousal of violation of these prohibitions, and 
membership in groups that advocated interracial marriage.71 Crucial to the case 
was the fact that the university grounded its rule not on racial attitudes, but on 
Biblical scripture. The school therefore considered the exclusion of interracial 
dating to be a principal tenet of its religious community.72 Nevertheless, although 
the text of section 501(c)(3) did not speak to racial discrimination at all, the 
Supreme Court upheld the IRS determination, finding the service’s interpretation 
of the code provision to be permissible.73 
Robert Cover, in his article Nomos and Narrative, has famously criticized the 
reasoning of the Bob Jones decision, even while agreeing with the Court’s result. 
According to Cover, the Court assumed “a position that places nothing at risk and 
from which the Court makes no interpretive gesture at all, save the quintessential 
gesture to the jurisdictional canons: the statement that an exercise of political 
authority was not unconstitutional.”74 In particular, Cover argued that, by 
grounding its decision on an interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, the Court 
had sidestepped the crucial constitutional question of whether Congress could 
grant tax exemptions to schools that discriminated on the basis of race.75 This was 
a problem for Cover because he believed that if a state legal authority were going 
to “kill off” the competing normative commitment of an alternative community, it 
should do so based on a profound normative commitment of its own.76 By avoiding 
the constitutional question, Cover complained, the Court had disserved both the 
religious community—whose normative commitments would be placed at the 
mercy of mere public policy judgments—and disserved racial minorities—who 
“deserved a constitutional commitment to avoiding public subsidization of 
racism.”77 
In contrast, had the clash between the university’s religious rule and the IRS 
code, or between the religious rule and the United States Constitution, been viewed 
as a choice-of-law decision, two aspects of the case would have been clarified. 
First, the Court would have analyzed and defined the relevant community 
affiliations at stake. Second, the Court would have been forced to grapple with the 
strength of its commitment to the principle of nondiscrimination, just as Cover 
urged. As a result, instead of simply asserting federal law, a conflicts analysis 
encourages negotiation among the different norms advanced by different 
communities. 
A more cosmopolitan and pluralist vision of conflict of laws recognizes that 
people and groups hold multiple community affiliations and takes those affiliations 
seriously. Thus, when a non-state legal practice is largely internal and primarily 
                                                 
71  Id. at 580–81. 
72  Id. at 580. 
73  Id. at 595. 
74  Cover, supra note 6, at 66. 
75  Id. 
76  See id. at 53–60. 
77  Id. at 67. 
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reflects individuals’ affiliation with the non-state community, the practice should 
be given more leeway than when the state itself is part of the relevant affiliation. In 
this case, the issue at stake was a tax exemption, a quintessentially state matter. 
Indeed, Bob Jones University was asking for a particular benefit for charitable 
organizations that was contained in the United States tax code. Therefore, for these 
purposes the place of the university within the nation-state was the most salient tie, 
making application of the federal law more justifiable. In contrast, as we shall see, 
other non-state normative commitments do not implicate the nation-state so 
directly. 
Moreover, even if the relevant community tie were largely with the religious 
community itself, certain norms might be held so strongly by the nation-state 
community that such norms would be applied regardless of the community 
affiliation. In choice-of-law analysis, this is usually called the public policy 
exception, and it allows courts to refuse to apply foreign law that would otherwise 
apply, if those legal norms are sufficiently repugnant. However, as noted 
previously, application of the public policy exception is rare, both as a normative 
and descriptive matter. Thus, if a court asserts such an exception, it must justify the 
use of public policy grounds by reference to precisely the sorts of deeply held 
commitments that Cover envisioned. In the Bob Jones case, for example, it might 
be that the nation-state’s deep commitment to eradicating racial discrimination 
would independently justify overriding the religious norms, regardless of the 
community affiliation analysis. 
Accordingly, a conflicts approach would not simply throw the claim of 
protected religious insularity to the mercy of political or bureaucratic judgments. 
Taking the ban on interracial dating seriously as law and performing a choice-of-
law analysis would create the obligation to engage in crucial line drawing. And 
although the community affiliation and public policy exception analyses in this 
case might justify application of state law, that will not always be the case. 
Consider, by way of contrast, Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, in which the Supreme Court refused to extend First 
Amendment protection to the religious use of peyote.78 There, unlike the tax 
exemption at issue in Bob Jones, the Indian tribe was not negotiating its 
relationship with the state; rather the use of peyote was part of a purely internal 
religious practice open primarily (or exclusively) to members of that community. 
Thus, a choice-of-law analysis based on community affiliation might well result in 
deference to the non-state norm. Moreover, the normative commitment to drug 
enforcement is perhaps better characterized as a governance choice than as an 
inexorable normative command. As such, the public policy exception is arguably 
less appropriate in this context than when addressing racial discrimination. 
Applying these principles, a choice-of-law analysis might well have permitted the 
religious practice in Smith. 
In the end, however, I am less concerned with the particular outcome than 
with the analytical framework. Conceiving of these clashes between religious and 
                                                 
78  494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
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state-based norms in conflicts terms reorients the inquiry in a way that takes more 
seriously the non-state community assertion. As a result, courts must wrestle both 
with the nature of the multiple community affiliations potentially at issue and with 
the need to articulate truly strong normative justifications for not deferring to the 
non-state norm. Both consequences make the choice-of-law decision a constructive 
terrain of engagement among multiple normative systems, rather than an arm of 
state government imposing its normative vision on all within its coercive power. 
Of course, this vision is not unproblematic. Two related objections 
immediately present themselves. First, a choice-of-law rule that tends to defer to 
non-state norms when they implicate only internal community affiliation might be 
seen to rest on the often-criticized distinction between public and private action. 
Indeed, the idea of deference in this context might come to look like the classic 
state deference to family privacy or autonomy.79 And just as family privacy was 
often invoked to shield domestic violence and gender hierarchy, so too may 
deference to “internal” community norms become deference to fundamentally 
illiberal norms. 
Second, as in the family context, we may make a mistake by assuming that 
the non-state community at issue is monolithic. Indeed, it may be that some 
members of the relevant community would prefer to have the state norm applied to 
their situation. As Judith Resnik has noted, Cover’s vision of multiple norm-
generating communities did not address the problem of conflict “within [such] 
communities about their own practices and authoritative interpretations.”80 Yet, 
such “contestation from within”81 (which is likely to occur along the fault lines of 
power hierarchies within the community) is an almost inevitable part of 
community norm creation. Thus, the choice-of-law question becomes, in part, a 
question of whose voices within a community are heard by which speakers of 
nation-state power. 
As to the concern that too much deference to “private” norms within a 
community will overly empower illiberal communities, it is important to remember 
that, because of the public policy exception, these norms, if sufficiently abhorrent, 
need not be applied by the state authority. After all, a lynch mob may also be a 
statement of community norms, but it need not for that reason necessarily be 
embraced. The object of a choice-of-law analysis is not to blindly follow non-state 
community norms, but to ensure that if a state asserts its own norms it does so self-
consciously. Indeed, simply identifying the state’s jurispathic power does not 
necessarily mean that we must reject all exercises of that power.82 Even Cover 
recognized the utility of a state court’s speaking in “imperial mode.”83 He noted 
that, when judges kill off competing law by asserting that “this one is law,” they 
                                                 
79  See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. 
MICH. J. L. REFORM 835, 836–37 (1985). 
80  Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, 
and Robert Cover, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17, 27 (2005). 
81  Id.  
82  See id. at 25. 
83  See Cover, supra note 6, at 13–14. 
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may do violence to the competing visions, but they also enable peace both because 
too much law is too chaotic to sustain and because some laws are simply too 
noxious to be applied.84 The point then is simply to make sure that the imposition 
of imperial, jurispathic law is not done blindly or arrogantly, but with 
intentionality and a respect for the other sources of law-making that are being 
displaced.85 A conflicts analysis at least opens space for such self-consciousness 
and care. 
More difficult is the problem of how to respond to Resnik’s arguments about 
inevitable conflicts within a non-state community concerning the content of that 
community’s norms. Certainly the existence of significant disagreement within the 
community might be factored into the decision of whether to apply the state norm. 
Thus, if some substantial portion of the non-state community were clamoring for 
the application of state law, such clamoring might blunt somewhat the need to 
defer to the non-state norm. 
More important, in thinking about how to address disputes within a non-state 
community, we must distinguish between two types of challenges. One concerns 
the proper understanding of what the content of the community’s law actually is, 
and the other concerns what that law ought to be. For example, in Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, a woman who was a member of an Indian tribe challenged her 
tribe’s refusal to consider her children to be tribal members.86 She did so, however, 
not based on an argument that the tribe had improperly interpreted its own 
community law (which based tribal membership on the father’s tribal membership, 
not the mother’s). Instead, she argued that the tribe’s law was inconsistent with a 
federal equal protection statute.87 Thus, the case did not present a contestation 
about the content of the community’s norms; it merely raised a choice-of-law issue 
about whether the tribal law or the federal statute should govern. And however 
difficult the resolution of that choice-of-law question might be, it does not raise the 
conundrum of how to determine the appropriate content of the non-state norms in 
the first place. 
Finally, in those relatively infrequent situations when the actual content of the 
non-state norm is at issue, courts can seek evidence to determine that community’s 
governing norm. Historical documentation, anthropological testimony, and 
evidence of ongoing practice might all be relevant. And again, to the extent that 
there are concerns that the non-state norm is the product of hierarchy, those 
concerns can be factored into the choice-of-law inquiry itself; they do not render it 
impossible to determine the content of the norm. 
                                                 
84  See id. at 53. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
A jurisprudence of hybridity does not, of course, make it any easier to reach 
actual decisions in individual cases. Indeed, determining when to defer to a non-
state norm and when not, when to allow a margin of appreciation and when to 
insist on a state norm, when to carve out zones of autonomy and when to encroach 
on them—these are all issues that are probably impossible ever to resolve 
satisfactorily. And I do not suggest that merely adopting a more inclusive set of 
jurisprudential or institutional mechanisms will eliminate clashes between state 
and non-state normative communities. Such clashes are both inevitable and 
unlikely ever to be dissolved. 
But the relevant question, it seems to me, is not whether law can eliminate 
conflict, but whether it has a chance of mediating disputes among multiple 
communities. And this question becomes increasingly important as normative 
communities increasingly overlap and intersect. Accordingly, instead of 
bemoaning the messiness of jurisdictional overlaps, we should accept them as a 
necessary consequence of the fact that communities cannot be hermetically sealed 
off from each other. Moreover, we can go further and consider the possibility that 
this jurisdictional messiness might, in the end, provide important systemic benefits 
by fostering dialogue among multiple constituencies, authorities, levels of 
government, and non-state communities. In addition, jurisdictional redundancy 
allows alternative ports of entry for strategic actors who might otherwise be 
silenced. 
Most fundamentally, all of this interaction is elided or ignored if we continue 
to think and speak as if legal and quasi-legal spheres can be formally differentiated 
from each other. Instead, we need to accept and perhaps even celebrate, the 
potentially jurisgenerative and creative role law might play in a plural world. 
Indeed, it is only if we take multiple affiliation seriously, if we seek dialogue 
across difference, if we accept unassimilated otherness, that we will have some 
hope of navigating the hybrid legal spaces that are all around us. 
 
